Stability And Security In Yemen
Reviving the Truce: Prospects for Stability and Security in Yemen Conference Report
Aniseh Bassiri Tabrizi | 2023.01.06
The truce between Ansar Allah (hereafter referred to as the Houthis) and the internationally recognised government came into force on 2 April and ended on 2 October 2022.
To this end, on 23 November 2022 RUSI hosted an expert-led discussion bringing together analysts, practitioners and humanitarian workers on Yemen. The event included a session held off-record with about 20 participants, and a session which was streamed online on RUSI’s website. Both sessions explored how the end of the truce in Yemen impacted the humanitarian situation on the ground and what the prospects for stability and security in the country are moving forward.
This report summarises the major conclusions and talking points of both events, focusing on the insights that emerged about the humanitarian situation on the ground, the challenges linked to renewing and expanding the truce agreement, and what role international actors, the UK in particular, should play to address both issues.
The Humanitarian Situation on the Ground
Most participants argued that the six-month UN-brokered truce in Yemen led to an improvement of the situation on the ground. As a result, there were no cross-border attacks, no attacks from the Houthis against Saudi Arabia and no attack from Saudi Arabia against Houthi-controlled areas. Violence within Yemen continued, especially on the frontlines, but the overall decrease in hostilities meant there was a significant drop in civilian, including child, casualties. Furthermore, the movement of people, feelings of safety and security, and humanitarian conditions generally improved, including for children. One practitioner explained that during the truce, the internationally recognised government of Yemen could focus on the delivery of services and, even with the challenges it continued to face in terms of limited funding, improvements to overall quality of life could be seen. Furthermore, the re-opening of Sana’a airport facilitated the movement of people and improved the population’s access to healthcare and business opportunities. The increased flow of fuel through the Hodeidah port also positively affected the livelihoods of most Yemenis as, during the truce, three times the total amount of fuel was available, easing shortages at the pump and reducing the cost of transport, food and other commodity prices. The practitioner added that, without the truce, the impact of the war in Ukraine in terms of food security and increase in prices would have been much worse than it has been for Yemen.
While the truce was mostly perceived as having a positive impact on the humanitarian situation across the country, a couple of humanitarian workers presented views from displaced persons that showed that not everyone saw the dividends. Many IDPs in certain areas of the country felt there was no impact on their lives as access to work, basic goods and services, and aid remained difficult, nor did their perception of safety or security increase as a result. The spikes of insecurity in the south also limited the delivery of humanitarian assistance in these areas despite the truce. One humanitarian worker explained how the continued presence of explosive weapons remains a significant threat to civilians but also a challenge in terms of restricting the freedom of movement in Yemen, including during the truce, given that roads stayed closed due to the risk of landmines and IEDs. Children continue to be disproportionately impacted by landmines and other explosive remnants of war. Another humanitarian worker highlighted how women continued to lack mobility as a result of the mahram (male guardian) requirement, arguing that this is an example of how the Houthis are trying to impose their culture and views across the country, with a negative impact on the population as a whole.
While most argued that there is still a de facto truce despite the failure to secure its renewal back in October, this is fragile, with the potential for full conflict to erupt once again and the situation on the ground being difficult in both security and humanitarian terms, with severe implications for civilians. An analyst discussed how the recent attacks conducted by the Houthis, following the collapse of the truce, targeting critical infrastructure in the south, including the Al-Mukalla port, challenged the government’s ability to export oil and affected the stability of the currency, undermining the ability of the population to afford basic goods. A humanitarian worker argued that divisions within the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) not only create fewer opportunities for a compromise between the parties, but also pose a risk in terms of a return to confrontation. The PLC could see a return to war as the only way to find unity in the face of the same enemy (the Houthis) while also attempting to increase its leverage on the future of the country, particularly with regards to the Saudis. Another analyst explained how, in November, Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula has managed to increase its activity in the south of the country, showcasing another potential area of escalation and conflict in the absence of a renewal of the truce or an extended deal.
Challenges Linked to Renewing and Expanding the Truce
Several participants argued that the truce was agreed in the first place because it was in all parties’ interests, with one analyst explaining that there was not even the need for a monitoring mechanism given how much all sides were keen to maintain it. The difference now is that one side (the Houthis) feels that it is in a stronger position and believes it is winning the war, with the war economy benefiting it significantly. Until the benefits of peace outweigh those of war, there will be no incentive for the Houthis to end the conflict.
This seems to be the main reason why the outcome of the talks between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia appears to be still uncertain for most participants. Much of the focus in these talks is currently on revenue sharing compared with power sharing, which used to be the main point of contention between the two sides. One analyst explained that, despite perceiving themselves as the winning side, the Houthis have not managed to gain the control over the resources they aimed for and are thus willing to entertain the idea of a truce if they can get enough control over resources in return. In particular, the Houthis are demanding that the salaries of civil servants in Houthi-controlled areas, including their fighters, are paid through the revenues of crude oil in the areas of the PLC; they also asked for a share of these revenues as a condition for the renewal of the truce.
Some participants, particularly practitioners and analysts, argued that the shift in focus on to issues of wealth and resource sharing demonstrates the seriousness to reach an agreement by all sides, including the Houthis, who appear ready to consider an option that does not involve fighting, albeit with significant demands in return. It was also described as promising in terms of having the potential to unlock a broader political process – something that other tracks seem less capable of achieving.
Other participants, particularly from a humanitarian background, criticised the ongoing talks between the Houthis and the Saudis, arguing that even if they manage to reach a deal, this is unlikely to translate into something tangible and positive for the Yemeni population at large. The main reason is that only the Houthis are involved in the talks, with all other Yemeni actors being excluded despite having been affected by the conflict. One former practitioner also argued that there is little leverage or influence international actors can have on the Houthis. Even Iran, while being a key supporter of the Houthis and favouring specific outcomes, is sometimes sidelined as the group decides and acts based on its own calculations and interests.
The fact that the Houthi-Saudi track is not connected to the UN track was presented as a further reason for scepticism among some participants, who doubted that even a potential deal could lead to a broader, more sustainable and more inclusive political settlement. One humanitarian worker also warned against the approach of the international community, which has so far failed to promote a Yemen-centric process in talks, looking instead at the conflict from the lenses of neighbouring countries, in particular the ones who belong to the Gulf Cooperation Council.
What Role for the UK?
Many of the participants argued that international actors could and should play a more active role in improving the humanitarian situation on the ground, as well as facilitating a political settlement in Yemen. The UK was highlighted by most participants as a key actor, given its membership of the Quad (together with the US, Saudi Arabia and the UAE), its role as UN Security Council penholder on Yemen, its membership of the Human Rights Council and its strong relations with Oman.
On the humanitarian front, participants argued that the UK could help in ensuring the response is adequate to the needs of the population by collecting and mapping all efforts currently taking place and identifying potential gaps. While in 2021 the UK announced a significant reduction to its aid budget, several participants argued the UK is likely to continue its commitment to Yemen, including through its funding for humanitarian issues, although the impact of cuts are being felt according to humanitarian experts. Nevertheless, the UK, for instance, has a food security programme run by the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, which is aimed at aiding those identified as most in need in Yemen (including women and marginalised groups). It is also supporting a project which aims to create a more enabling environment for women’s meaningful political participation and inclusion in Yemen. Furthermore, it is continuing to fund a programme in Yemen to clear the ground of landmines and explosive remnants of war, hoping this will reduce the threat posed to civilians. Despite the limited humanitarian funding available, practitioners argued money will continue to be allocated to these projects and priorities – although, according to those with humanitarian expertise, not at the same levels across all areas as in the past, leading to shortfalls in the overall aid response. Some participants with a humanitarian background argued that more should be done by the UK in terms of protection of civilians in Yemen, especially given its membership of the UN Human Rights Council, including by ensuring the UK does not provide UK-built and licensed arms to any of the parties to the conflict, as this would further fuel confrontation and jeopardise the prospects for a political settlement. Humanitarian experts also argued that the UK has a key role to play in supporting the establishment of an independent, international accountability mechanism to hold perpetrators of violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law to account. Currently there is no mechanism in place and grave violations against civilians, including children, continue to take place with impunity.
The UK, together with other international players, can also play a role in facilitating a political settlement. While a Saudi-Houthi dialogue should be encouraged as it is the track presenting the greatest chance for a renewal of a truce or, even better, a ceasefire, ultimately the shared view was that only a UN process can guarantee that the various parties to the conflict will have a seat at the table, and that the elements of a political settlement be truly inclusive. Participants from various fields argued that only a UN-led process can guarantee the sustainability of the final agreement and allow the benefits to be perceived tangibly by a broader spectrum of the population. The UK is currently supporting the diplomatic efforts carried out by the UN, including by actively and frequently engaging with the UN Special Envoy on Yemen, Hans Grundberg. However, some participants argued that more could be done to ensure children, young people and women are better included in the process, so their voices and needs are heard, including by ensuring women can gain freedom of movement and work in a future Yemen. One practitioner also suggested that the UK could build on its efforts to address Mahramrelated restrictions and play a leading role in convening donors in the country to call for an end to the continued restrictions facing female aid workers, while at the same time supporting humanitarian access. Besides ensuring that a truce implementation supports sustained, free and unfettered humanitarian access across Yemen, the UK could also push for the inclusion of the needs of IDPs in the truce process. One humanitarian worker argued finally that actors from the south, including journalists and activists, should be included and engaged with as they have so far been marginalised from the process, with the risk they could act as a spoiler.
Key Takeaways
Overall, the truce had a positive, if uneven, impact for civilians on the ground, and the aim should therefore be for the international community to facilitate its renewal and expansion. The UK has a leading role to play in this sense, including by ensuring meaningful participation and inclusion from different sides of Yemeni society, including children, women and young people; continued engagement with the UN Special Envoy’s Office is key to facilitating that. The UK should build on its efforts to date and play a leading role with parties to the conflict to ensure safe and unimpeded humanitarian access, including through high-level engagement on rolling back Mahram restrictions directly with involved parties, as well as through UN leadership.
Future negotiations on the truce should also consider lessons learned from the previous agreement, including addressing the specific needs of IDPs, and better supporting the wider goals of improving humanitarian access across the country. Mining and clearance efforts must also be prioritised to reduce civilian harm, even after hostilities cease.
With the collapse of the truce, it is crucial for governments such as the UK to support the establishment of an international, independent accountability mechanism to collect, consolidate, preserve and analyse evidence of abuses and violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law to prepare files to facilitate criminal proceedings. Such a mechanism would be a deterrent directed at those perpetrating serious violations.
Regular consultations between practitioners and analysts as well as humanitarian workers and civil society organisations can ensure a better understanding of the situation on the ground and the collective identification of ways to increase the chances of creating a more stable and secure Yemen.
Aniseh Bassiri Tabrizi is Senior Research Fellow and lead of the MENA programme at the International Security Studies department at RUSI.